Revisiting Strict Product Liability: Taking Law and Economics Further by Richardson, Megan L.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 35, Number 1 (Spring 1997) Article 5
Revisiting Strict Product Liability: Taking Law and
Economics Further
Megan L. Richardson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Review Essay
This Review Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Richardson, Megan L.. "Revisiting Strict Product Liability: Taking Law and Economics Further." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 35.1
(1997) : 195-207.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol35/iss1/5
REVIEW ESSAY: REVISITING STRICT
PRODUCT LIABILITY: TAKING LAW
AND ECONOMICS FURTHER©
A Review of
EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING
THE FACTS SERIOUSLY
DONALD DEWEEs, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996)
BY MEGAN L. RICHARDSON**
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 195
II. THREE NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES: ECONOMICS,
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE .................... 197
A. Economics: Overcoming the Disutility of
Uncertain and Onerous Standards of Liability .................................. 197
B. Distributive Justice and the Economics of Loss Spreading ........................ 201
C. Corrective Justice: Restoration for "Moral Wrongs" ............................. 204
11. CONCLUSION ............................................................ 207
I. INTRODUCTION
In "Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Tort"1 Guido Calabresi
and Jon Hirschoff, writing as lawyer-economists in the early 1970s, made
a radical argument for strict product liability based on a "cheaper cost
avoider" test for liability. First, they argued that the test would reduce
© 1997, M.L. Richardson.
** Senior Lecturer in Law, the University of Melbourne.
1 G. Calabresi & J.T. Hirschoff, "Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Torts" (1972) 81 Yale
L.J. 1055.
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administrative costs since the court would merely determine "which of
the parties is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis
between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that
decision once it is made" 2 without determining whether the injury
should have been avoided (as under negligence). 3  Second, they
concluded that the test is more likely to result in optimal injury
avoidance in practice because more claims are likely to be successful
where there was negligence but this cannot be proved. 4 Finally, they
invoked a distributive justice argument: that the manufacturers' ability to
spread the costs of strict liability through the prices charged for their
products, effectively insures product users against the risks of injury 5
Since Calabresi and Hirschoff wrote their article, strict liability
has been adopted for product injuries in the United States (continuing a
trend noted by Calabresi and Hirschoff) and, more recently, Europe and
Australia.6 But none of the tests for strict liability exactly matches the
original Calabresi and Hirschoff test. The trend towards strict product
liability has been criticized by economists and lawyer-economists,
including Donald Dewees, David Duff, and Michael Trebilcock who in a
comprehensive study, Exploring the Domain ofAccident Law, favour the
Canadian approach of maintaining negligence liability.7 Other chapters
of the book, which represents an expanded and updated version of
Dewees and Trebilcock's groundbreaking article of the early 1990s, "The
Efficacy of the Tort System and its Alternatives," 8 deal with automobile
accidents,9 medical accidents,10 environmental injuries,)) and workplace
2 See ibid. at 1060, adding, ibid. at 1068, that the starting point can also be that "by and large
manufacturers are better suited than users to make the cost-benefit analysis."
3 Ibid. at 1060-61.
4 See ibid at 1058 where Calabresi & Hirschoff emphasize the ideal world as being especially
necessary for the negligence standards to operate efficiently.
5bmid. at 1069-70.
6 See also J. Stapleton, Product Liability (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994); and I. Malkin & E.
Wright, "Product Liability under the Trade Practices Act-Adequately Compensating for Personal
Injury" (1993) 1 Torts L. J. 63.
7 D. Dewees, D. Duff & M. Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the
Facts Seriously (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996), c. 4.
8 D. Dewees & M.J. Trebilcock, "The Efficacy of the Tort System and its Alternatives: A
Review of Empirical Evidence" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 57.
9 Supra note 7, c. 2.
10 bid. c. 3.
11Ibid. c. 5.
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injuries.12 These topics, however-while fascinating and important in
themselves-will not be discussed in detail in this review.
Generally, it may be said that the great strengths of this book are
its focus on empirical data rather than what the authors term "abstract
theorizing," 13 and a preparedness to consider the possibility that,
ultimately, the best solution to the problems of tort law may be to move
beyond tort to adopt government penal, regulatory, and/or
compensatory alternatives (even though these are not the options
preferred for product injuries where the authors can find little empirical
evidence of success for such non-tort approaches in practice). But one
of the risks of a primarily experience-based approach is that alternative
theoretical approaches which have not been tried in practice are given
little weight. 'In this review, it is suggested that the authors' criticisms of
strict product liability may indeed be able to be answered by revisiting
the basis and operation of the Calabresi and Hirschoff test.
II. THREE NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES: ECONOMICS,
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock evaluate the merits and defects of
each of the categories of liability, which they consider in terms of three
normative perspectives of economic efficiency, distributive justice and
corrective justice. Not surprisingly, given the background and expertise
of the authors, most of the discussion is economic. Even the treatment
of distributive justice, identified in terms of the "capacity to spread risk
and provide meaningful, expeditious, and low-cost compensation or
insurance to ... victims," 14 is closely linked in the case of product liability
to the authors' economic arguments about the inefficiency of
manufacturers providing insurance for non-negligently caused injuries at
a cost ultimately borne by users through the prices paid for products.
The discussion of corrective justice, as "obliging a person whose morally
culpable behaviour has violated another's autonomy to restore the latter
to as nearly as possible his or her pre-injury status,"15 is more clearly
distinct from the authors' economic arguments, although the meaning of
"morally culpable behaviour" is apparently accepted as coinciding with
12 Ibid. c. 6.
13 Ibid. at 3.
14 Ibid. at 6.
15 Ibid. at 8.
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the legal, and therefore the economic standard, of negligence. The
attempt to accommodate corrective justice in a discussion primarily
about the economics of product liability raises most clearly the question
of how a fundamentally non-economic approach can be married with an
economic one, a question which has been only superficially addressed in
law and economics writings to date although Dewees, Duff, and
Trebilcock provide some extremely valuable insights.
A. Economics: Overcoming the Disutility of
Uncertain and Onerous Standards of Liability
The principal economically based criticism which Dewees, Duff,
and Trebilcock make of strict product liability is that the current tests for
assessing liability in practice, in particular the "reasonable expectations"
and "risk utility" tests, are confusing and inefficient in their operation
because of their uncertain application and their tendency to favour
product users over manufacturers.1 6 A particular problem with the tests
is that, in a world of constantly expanding knowledge as to risks, the
standard of information expected of product manufacturers becomes
crucial.1 7 In practice, as Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock argue, both the
consumer expectation test and the risk-utility test, which "directs [...]
courts to balance the risks of the current design, as now revealed, against
the utility that the product and alternative designs provide," may require
more than an efficient level of knowledge of product manufacturers.18
Conversely, as far as product users are concerned, the tests are unclear
as to the level of knowledge expected with the standard for warnings
particularly fraught with confusion and incoherence.1 9
In economic terms, apart from adding to the costs of litigating
product liability claims (and the disincentives for claims to be initiated,
impinging on the incentives for optimal care),20 the consequence of such
16Ibid. at 192.
1 7 See also Stapleton, supra note 6 at 236-38.
18 Supra note 7 at 192. See also D. Boivin, "Strict Products Liability Revisited" (1995) 33
Osgoode Hall L. J. 487 at 511-13.
19 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock, supra note 7 at 193. See further H. Latin, "Good Warnings,
Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations" (1994) 41 UCLA L Rev. 1193.
20 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock, supra note 7 at 194-96 with reference to a 1991 study showing
that only 2 per cent of those injured in product-related accidents outside the workplace actually
took some action: see D. Hensler et al., Compensation for Accidental Injuries in the United States
(Santa Monica: Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corporation, 1991).
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uncertainty in the tests which apply in practice has been a possibly
negative impact on levels of innovation. Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock
refer to a survey conducted in 1987 among product manufacturers in the
United States indicating decisions by 47 per cent of respondents to
discontinue product lines, and by 39 per cent not to introduce new
products, while 25 per cent reported the discontinuation of product
research. 21 The decisions are attributed to the substantial increases in
insurance premiums which followed the advent of strict product liability
in the United States.22 The results are not entirely determinative, as
Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock point out. For example, it is not clear
whether the response among insurers and manufacturers to strict
product liability was a reasonable reaction to the real prospects of
liability. Also, the sample used to assess manufacturer reactions (a total
of 550 respondents, or 13.5 to 14 per cent of those contacted) was
extremely small. In any event, the same surveys indicate some positive
effects of strict product liability, revealing that 35 per cent of
respondents introduced product-specific safety improvements, 33 per
cent restructured existing product lines, and 47 per cent instituted
improvements to instructions regarding product use and hazard
warnings.23 Nevertheless, the authors conclude that there is sufficient
evidence to provide a basis for concern as to the efficiency of strict
product liability in practice.
Interestingly, at one point Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock suggest
that a strict liability test may work efficiently if responsibility is placed on
the "best-placed decider." 24 Although the suggestion is not developed, it
recalls the Calabresi and Hirschoff test 2S which Calabresi with Alvin
Klevorick later interpreted as a "cheaper fact-finder" test 2 6 A focus on
the best placed decider suggests that the question of which party is the
"cheaper cost avoider" may be addressed, at least initially, by treating
the costs of acquiring and assimilating information as relevant to
avoidance costs. For instance, if further research is needed fully to
21 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock,supra note 7 at 197-98, citing a 1988 United States Conference
Board report: see E.P. McGuire, The Impact of Product Liability (New York: Conference Board,
1988) at 3.
22 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock, supra note 7 at 198.
23 Ibid.
2 4 Ibid. at 193.
25 See supra note 1, especially at 1067-85.
2 6 G. Calabresi & A. Klevorick, "Four Tests for Liability in Torts" (1985) 14 J. Legal Stud. 585
at 625; and MJ. Trebilcock, "The Future of Tort Law: Mapping the Contours of the Debate" (1989)
15 Can. Bus. L.J. 471 at 474.
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identify risks then-as Calabresi and Hirschoff indicate with respect to
the analogous case where risks are known but further research is
required to develop cheaper safety alternatives-"[r]elatively, the
manufacturer is better suited to make the only cost-benefit analysis that
matters, which is one between further research and current damages." 27
The analysis implies that the costs of acquiring and dealing with
information.should be taken into account in any decision as to which
party is the cheaper cost avoider.
But the cheaper cost avoider test, as framed by Calabresi and
Hirschoff, does not permit the focus to be exclusively on the cost of
acquiring and assimilating information, except in cases where this is "the
only cost-benefit analysis that matters." 28 For instance, they say that, in
the case of warnings, the cost of understanding and acting on a warning
must be taken into account in deciding whether the manufacturer or
product user is the cheaper cost avoider:
[M]ere clarity of warnings or mere percentages of likelihood of harm may not by
themselves resolve the issue. For these are only factors going to the basic question of
who is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis and act upon it, and must be
considered together with other factors, such as availability of substitutes and the nature of
the user's use of the product in order to determine liability."29
The reasoning suggests that all factors which impact on the ability to
avoid should be taken into account in determining which party is the
cheaper cost avoider.
The problem with a test which requires a general assessment of
information and control is that this may not provide a basis for a very
specific and predictable test of which party is the cheaper cost avoider,30
a concern which Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock may have felt about a
"best placed decider" test as well. 31 Nevertheless, the Calabresi and
Hirschoff test could potentially be developed into a test under which the
actual costs of avoidance are precisely assessed and compared in order
27 Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 1 at 1071.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. at 1063.
30 See, for instance, R.A. Posner, "Strict Liability: A Comment" (1973) 2 J. Legal Stud. 205 at
214.
31 See Trebilcocksupra note 26 at 474, criticizing the test for indeterminacy and arguing that
"it is not clear where the line might be drawn in any principled way."
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to determine which party is the cheaper cost avoider.3 2 Such an
approach would arguably also represent an improvement in certainty
and efficiency terms over the current tests for strict liability which apply
in practice. The cheaper cost avoider test, so developed, is now perhaps
closer to a negligence test than the original test as framed by Calabresi
and Hirschoff. But, on the other hand, it is clearly not a full negligence
test since the court is not required to assess whether avoidance was
worthwhile (with the ancillary costs involved in a court making such a
decision). 33 The point to be made here is that, once the move is taken
beyond the realm of actual practice, the Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock
conclusion that "it would be desirable to reinstate the negligence
regime"34 is debatable as being necessarily the best option in terms of
economic efficiency.
B. Distributive Justice and the Economics of Loss Spreading
In what is partly an economic argument, Dewees, Duff, and
Trebilcock suggest that, contrary to Calabresi and Hirschoff's
distributive justice argument for strict product liability, not all product
users may need or wish to be effectively insured against the costs of
economically unavoidable injuries through the prices paid for products. 35
The authors refer to evidence provided by Alan Schwartz that, contrary
to the assumptions behind strict liability, product users may, on average,
respond appropriately to information as to product risks or be risk
averse in their demands for product safety measures 36 George Priest
has also pointed out that particular low-risk or low-income product users
may prefer not to pay insurance costs calculated on the basis of the costs
of avoidance for the average manufacturer and user 3 7 Schwartz himself
32 See further S.G. Gilles, "Negligence, Strict Liability and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider" (1992)
78 Va. L. Rev. 1291; and M. Richardson, "'Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Tort': A Modified
Proposal for Australian Product Liability" (1996) 4 Torts L.J. 24
33 Although Gilles, supra note 32 at 1317, points out that the distinction breaks down in
particular cases where "to determine the cheapest precautions, the court ... must determine the
effect of various precautions on the probability and magnitude of expected accident costs."
3 4 Supra note 7 at 205.
35 Ibid. at 190-91.
36 See A. Schwartz, "Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis" (1988)
97 Yale L.J. 353.
37 G.L Priest, "A Theory of Consumer Product Warranty" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1297 at
1350-51.
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has further argued that product users would generally prefer to limit
insurance to direct pecuniary losses rather than extending this to pain
and suffering, which money can do little to assuage and which is difficult
to value, explaining why there is no developed market for pain and
suffering insurance 3 8 Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock finally comment
that if a broader distributive justice perspective is adopted, any system of
tort liability represents an expensive and incomplete system of
insurance 3 9 They ultimately conclude, however, that the economic costs
of no-fault compensatory alternatives to tort liability for product injuries,
even if coupled with penal and/or regulatory measures, outweigh the
benefits of providing broader and more uniform coverage. In general,
,compensation schemes can be expensive to operate and tend to
eliminate incentives to take optimal care;40 and penal or regulatory
measures, although useful in some areas and capable of improvement
with a more rigorous cost-benefit approach, have been shown to be
generally too broad-based to be efficient for many product-related
injuries where it is difficult to predict the cheaper cost avoider on a
category basis.41
From a broader distributive justice perspective, there must be
better systems of victim compensation than tort liability, especially given
the transaction costs of initiating and pursuing tort remedies in court.42
The New Zealand experience of a no-fault accident compensation
scheme is a good example of how distributive jistice, if defined simply in
terms of loss-spreading, may be served by a non-tort approach.43 But
the unpopularity of the New Zealand scheme in a period of economic
38 Schwartz, supra note 36 at 364-66.
39 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock, supra note 7 at 206.
40 Ibid. at 240-45, with reference to compensation schemes for vaccine-related injuries and
drug related injuries and, more generally, at 136-46. See also M.J. Trebilcock, "The Social
Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modem North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on
the Liability Insurance Crisis" (1987) 24 San Diego L. Rev. 929 at 994 [hereinafter "Deterrence
Dilemma"]; and M.J. Trebilcock, "Incentive Issues in the Design of No-Fault Compensation
Systems" (1989) 39 U.T.L.L 19.
41 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock, supra note 7 at 214-40.
42 See Hensler et al., supra note 20; and Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock, supra note 7 at 207,
noting a 1986 study which indicates that, on average, only 46 per cent of damages paid in product
liability cases represents compensation: see J.S. Kakalik & N. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in
Tort Litigation (Santa Monica: Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corporation, 1986).
43 See New Zealand Law Commission, Personal Injuty Prevention and Recovery: Report on the
Accident Compensation Scheme (Wellington: New Zealand Law Commission, 1988) [hereinafter
N.Z. Accident Compensation Report]; and Rt. Hon. Sir G. Palmer, "New Zealand's Accident
Compensation Scheme: Twenty Years On" (1994) 44 U.T.LJ. 223.
[VOL 35 NO. I
Review Essay
rationalism, and its recent retrenchment, 44 indicates the general
concerns that economists and lawyer-economists have about the
economic effects of such schemes, even if coupled with penal or
regulatory measures aimed at increasing levels of information and safety
in the community.45 Nevertheless, if the conclusion is then that tort
liability is to be preferred on economic grounds, a strict liability test that
requires manufacturers, as the superior cost spreaders, to bear the costs
of economically unavoidable injuries4 6 may still be no worse in
distributive justice terms than negligence liability. Negligence, after all,
requires users either to bear the costs individually or rely on their own
insurance, inadequate though it might be to cover their full costs.47
Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock identify the deficiencies of the
insurance market, particularly in the United States, in their
recommendations for comprehensive first-party disability insurance
coverage (recommendations that are not limited to product users).48
But the question remains whether negligence liability, even if coupled
with first party disability insurance (and taking into account the
administrative costs of providing such insurance),49 would necessarily be
superior to strict liability from a distributive justice perspective.
Interestingly, here Schwartz's evidence may be interpreted as indicating
a general preference for product manufacturers to provide insurance or
extra safeguards to users: for instance, showing that consumers are
prepared to pay more for safer common household products, that
workers appreciate that there may be risks to life and health in the
workplace and exact wage premiums for bearing them, and that
44 See the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act, 1992 (N.Z.), 1992, no. 13,
in force 1 July 1992, [repealing and replacing the Accident Compensation Act, 1982 (N.Z.), 1982]
[hereinafterA.R.C.L Act, 1992]. The new statute was described by one judge as having aims which
are "much less wide than the aims of the former Act" in endeavouring to establish an
insurance-based scheme which is "financially affordable": see Magee v. A.C.RJLC [1994] N.Z.A.R.
19 at 22 (D.C.).
45 See, for instance, R.A. Epstein, Accident Compensation: The Faulty Basis of No-Fault and
State Provision (Wellington: New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1996), although compare Palmer,
supra note 43; and N.Z. Accident Compensation Report, supra note 43 at 15-16.
46 That is, injuries which, in economic terms, should not be avoided because the costs of
avoidance outweigh the benefits.
47 See Hensler et al., supra note 20 at 105, for empirical findings regarding the insurance
market for product users (judged to be particularly weak for non-occupationally induced injuries).
48 See Dewees, Duff & Trebilcocksupra note 7 at 432-36.
49 See N.Z. Accident Compensation Report, supra note 43 at 14, comparing the costs of private
insurance to the costs of administering the New Zealand no fault compensation scheme which at
that stage had no insurance element (although compare theA.R.C.L. Act, 1992, supra note 44.
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consumers routinely purchase warranty coverage when buying expensive
cars and computers.S0 Furthermore, contrary to Schwartz, a study by
Steven Croley and Jon Hanson shows a preference for pain and suffering
to be covered by tort liability, with product users prepared to pay the
insurance costs in the price of their products.S1 In the light of the
empirical evidence, it is questionable what the advantage of negligence
liability, even if coupled with comprehensive first-party disability
insurance, would be for the average product user if strict liability already
mirrors to some extent his or her optimal insurance contract.52
If this is so, the interests of particular low-risk or low-income
product users may better be met by permitting contracting out of strict
liability rather than adopting a general negligence standard which affects
all users (as recommended by Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock).S 3
However, there are also problems with that option as far as individual
users are concerned. In particular, it may be predicted that
manufacturers are likely to prefer standard contract terms as a method
of avoiding transaction costs.54 And the question then, as Trebilcock
points out elsewhere, is whether such terms would take account of
particular users who cannot necessarily be assumed to be sufficiently
informed, sophisticated, and aggressive to adequately protect their
interests.55
* C. Corrective Justice: Restoration for "Moral Wrongs"
As Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock explain, the focus of a
corrective justice perspective is on correcting past injuries rather than
guiding and controlling future behaviour or compensating victims merely
5 0 See Schwartz, supra note 36 at 379; and, further, Dewees, Duff & Trebilcocksupra note 7 at
190-91.
51 S. Croley & J. Hanson, "The Non-Pecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering
Damages in Tort Law" (1995) 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1785.
52 See similarly Schwartz, supra note 36 at 404-08, although arguing for a broader strict
liability than the cheaper cost avoider test would provide (but with a contributory negligence
defence). See Richardson, supra note 32 at 35-36, regarding the advantages of a cheaper-cost
avoider test in insurance terms.
53 Schwartz, supra note 36 at 404-08.
54 Schwartz acknowledges this, ibid. at 371, stating that "[flirms commonly are unresponsive to
the preferences of consumer groups, rather than the preferences of every consumer."
55 See M.J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1993) at 119-26.
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for misfortune.56 In Kantian terms, this perspective is based upon a
principle that persons should be treated as ends in themselves and not
merely as the means to the ends of others. The difficulty, as John Rawls
stated in his important discussion of Kant, is knowing precisely what the
standard requires in individual situations of decisionmaking. 5 7 In
particular, little work has been done in this regard as far as resolving
issues of tort liability is concerned, although Dewees, Duff, and
Trebilcock have gone further than other economists and lawyer-
economists in acknowledging and accommodating a corrective justice
perspective in their work.
Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock, basing their treatment of
corrective justice on the writings of Ernest Weinrib,58 refer to corrective
justice as "obliging a person whose morally culpable behaviour has
violated another's autonomy to restore the latter to as nearly as possible
his or her pre-injury status."59 The statement provokes the question of
what is meant by "morally culpable behaviour." Dewees, Duff, and
Trebilcock apparently accept Weinrib's view that this equates with the
legal standard of "fault," leading to their conclusion that corrective
justice can be treated as consistent with negligence liability.60 But, as
pointed out by John Gardner, critiquing Weinrib's latest book,61 strict
liability may more closely approximate the Kantian ideal if a broader
view is taken of moral agency as being concerned with responsibility for
accomplishments rather than merely for purposes, and under which
actors are conceived of in terms of their "successes and failures as well
as [their] attempts and neglects; in which it is sometimes the
achievements and not just the thought, or effort, that counts."62
Indeed, economics, being explicitly concerned with outcomes
rather than merely purposes, may already provide a basis for responding
56 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock, supra note 7 at 8.
57 J. Rawls,A Theory of Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972) at 179-80.
58 E.J. Weinrib, "Towards a Moral Theory of Negligence Law" (1983) 2 L. & Phil. 37;
"Liberty, Community and Corrective Justice" (1989) 1 J. L. & Juris. 3; and "Understanding Tort
Law" (1989) 23 Val. U. L. Rev. 485. See also E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) at 145-52 [hereinafter The Idea of Private Law].
59 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcocksupra note 7 at 8.
60 For a more elaborate and critical discussion, acknowledging that there may be different
views of corrective justice, see "Deterrence Dilemma," supra note 40. He notes that "even if
[WVeinrib's] view of the tort system is persuasive, it leaves unaddressed the insurance needs of many
injured individuals who would not be compensated": ibid. at 985.
61 The Idea of Private Law, supra note 58.
62 j. Gardner, "The Purity and Priority of Private Law" (1996) 46 U.T.L.J. 459 at 492.
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to Gardner's more sophisticated view of moral agency. The economic
standard of Pareto efficiency which (unlike the more common
Kaldor-Hicks standard) requires that no party can be made worse off in
order to make another better off63 has been identified by Anthony
Kronman as essentially a Kantian standard. 64 The economic justification
for the Pareto standard is that, if strictly applied as requiring a voluntary
transaction, it avoids the need for a court or other decisionmaker to
engage in interpersonal comparisons of utility.65
Nevertheless, as Calabresi effectively demonstrates, the standard
so strictly framed is virtually useless as a tool of normative economic
analysis since "the set of Pareto exchanges which would make no one
worse off and at least one person better off must ex ante be a void
set"66-that is, why would there be no consent except that someone
considers they are losing in some broadly defined way? The conclusion
(although not apparently Calabresi's) may therefore be that a less strict
version of Paretianism should be adopted to allow for third party
intervention.67 Indeed, it may well be argued that a strict liability test
that makes product manufacturers responsible to users for injuries
regardless of negligence comes closest to satisfying the Paretian
requirement that no party can be made worse off in order to make
someone else better off.68 But it should be noted that, at this point, the
Pareto standard is no longer simply an economic standard. Rather, its
appeal is intuitively a moral one,6 9 in corrective justice terms placing
responsibility on agents to those around them for their acts and failures
to act where harm would otherwise result.70
63 See further J. Coleman, "Efficiency, Utility and Welfare Maximisation" in Markets, Morals
and the Law (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 95 at 97.
64 A. Kronman, "Wealth Maximisation as a Normative Principle" (1980) 9 J. Legal Stud. 227
at 235-36
65 G. Calabresi, "The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further" (1990) 100 Yale L.J.
1211 at 1216-17.
661bid. at 1216, adding that limiting the analysis to take account only of factors which can be
valued in financial terms, or which society considers to be worthwhile or important, introduces a
"non-unanimously held value into the scheme," gutting the Pareto concept of its economic force.
67 Coleman, supra note 63 at 124.
68 If Kronman's framing of the Kantian-Pareto standard is accepted as meaning merely that
"no one should be treated as an unwilling instrument of another's happiness," (see supra note 64 at
235, emphasis added), then even the cheaper-cost avoider test, to the extent it approximates the
product user's optimal insurance contract, can meet this corrective justice standard.
69 See also Calabresi, supra note 65 at 1216.
70 See Gardner, supra note 62.
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III. CONCLUSION
In the writings of many economists and lawyer-economists to
date, distributive and corrective justice perspectives, if acknowledged at
all, are treated as inferior to the writers' economic perspectives.
Fortunately, Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock take non-economic values
seriously in their comprehensive analysis of accident law in Exploring the
Domain of Accident Law, leading to a much richer consideration of the
costs and benefits of particular forms of tort liability or alternatives to
tort liability. The question remains whether economic and
non-economic values can ever be fully accommodated in the same
analysis, particularly in the case of corrective justice whose dictates seem
to be so opposed to the person-neutral character of classical utilitarian
economics. In their introductory discussion of corrective justice,
Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock suggest that the source of commonality
between law and economics and corrective justice may be the focus that
both can have on "notions of individual responsibility." 71 Certainly this
is true if individual responsibility is taken as meaning more than the
individual's right to be guaranteed "a sphere of influence in which they
will be able to operate, without having to justify themselves to the state
or to third parties,"72 the traditional libertarian defence of individual
liberty which has so influenced law and economics to date. Clearly,
Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock contemplate that both economic
efficiency and corrective justice, as indeed distributive justice, may
require some responsibility to others for product-related and other
injuries. It has been suggested in this review that ultimately an
alternative economic analysis may be needed if the perspectives are to
be fully harmonized. What is most important, however, is the set of
insights which the authors of Exporing the Domain of Accident Law
provide on the fundamental question of the relationship between
economic and other perspectives in their excellent book.
71 Supra note 7 at 8.
72 See R.A. Epstein, "Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal" (1975) 18 J.L. & Econ. 293
at 293-94.
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